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Abstract 
“Right to Buy” (RTB), a large-scale natural experiment by which incumbent tenants in public housing 
could buy properties at heavily-subsidised prices, increased the homeownership rate in Britain by over 
10 percentage points between 1980 and the late 1990s. This paper studies its impact on crime, 
showing that RTB generated significant reductions in property and violent crime that persist up to 
today. The gentrification of incumbent tenants and their behavioural changes were the main drivers of 
the crime reduction. This is evidence of a novel means by which gentrification, and housing 
provision, may have contributed to the sizable crime drops observed in several Western economies in 
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1. Introduction
In many countries, crime is spatially concentrated in areas characterised by low incomes and 
low rates of homeownership. Localities with high rates of tenancy in public housing commonly 
exhibit high crime rates, and Britain is no exception. This is not only because of differences in 
affluence between predominantly public and private housing areas, but also because residents 
in public housing have lower incentives to maintain the security and upkeep of their property 
and to invest in neighbourhood monitoring.  
Boosting homeownership is often viewed as a means of delivering benefits to 
communities, one of which is reduced crime. Underlying this is the idea that, when public 
housing tenants take on ownership of their properties, their incentives can adjust as they 
experience the positive private returns of crime-reducing investments (such as improving the 
security of the home), which capitalize into house prices, and therefore household wealth. 
Generating an understanding of the effects of homeownership on crime is therefore a first order 
research question in the economics of crime. 
This paper studies the impact of homeownership on crime in a novel way by examining 
a large-scale nationwide program of subsidised public housing sales in the United Kingdom 
(UK) known as the “Right to Buy” policy (hereafter RTB). This was established as one of the 
first legislative acts of the newly elected UK Conservative government led by Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979. Through the RTB policy, incumbent tenants in publicly-owned “council 
housing” (housing built and owned by local public authorities and rented to private tenants, 
henceforth called “public housing”) in the UK could purchase their rented accommodation at 
heavily-subsidised prices.1 The intention of the policy was to increase the long-run 
homeownership rate, with the underlying ethic of “an Englishman’s home is his castle”. It was 
heralded by the Conservative government as a means of improving local amenities and 
generating upward social mobility by giving citizens control over their housing.2  
1 The terms “council housing” and “social housing” indicate public housing in the UK. Public housing in the 
United Kingdom is managed in local jurisdictions by councils – hence the term for public housing is “council 
housing” in the UK. There are also social housing tenancies provided by co-operatives and local housing 
associations rather than private homeowners. A limited form of tenancy purchase of such properties was 
introduced in the 2000s under the policy “Right to Acquire”.  
2 In a speech delivered to the National Housebuilding Council in December 1984, Margaret Thatcher stated: 
“Spreading the ownership of property more widely is central to this Government's philosophy. It is central 
because where property is widely owned, freedom flourishes. Since we took office in 1979, 1.7 million more 
people have come to own their homes — 1.7 million more sole kings upon their own sole ground. That increase 
is one of our proudest achievements… But a house is more than this. It is a symbol of security, and a stake in 
the future. People who own houses do so not just for themselves, but for their children. They do so as members 
2 
The RTB policy had a significant impact on housing tenure. It was largely responsible 
for an increase in the UK homeownership rate from around 60% in 1979 to over 70% in the 
early 2000s. Specifically, whereas around 32% of dwellings in the UK were public houses in 
1979, totalling some 6.2 million properties, by the early 2000s around 2.8 million of these 
properties had been sold to their tenants (Jones and Murie, 2006). Although an innovative and 
internationally unique policy, RTB has until recently been little analysed (but see Disney and 
Luo, 2017).  
This paper studies the causal impact of the RTB policy on local crime rates. The 
empirical analysis uses large-scale data from all regions in England and Wales since the early 
1970s to study the RTB policy as a nationwide natural experiment. The bulk of public house 
sales occurred in the 1980s and area-level sales of public housing were matched to crime data 
over several decades to estimate both the short-run and long run effects of homeownership on 
crime. The analysis shows that the large movements in housing tenures induced by the RTB 
led to a lasting fall in the rates of crime.  
The main contribution of this study is therefore to document the lasting crime-reducing 
effect of increasing sales of public housing to indigenous communities, with the reduction in 
crime rates being driven primarily by behavioural changes within the local community. While 
migration and changes in the composition of households explain the crime-reducing effect of 
gentrification in most recent studies (e.g., Autor, Palmer and Pathak, 2019), our study reveals 
a novel means, not documented to date, by which gentrification may have contributed to the 
decline in crime in the United States and other Western economies in the 1990s and early 2000s 
(see Van Dijk and Vollaard, 2012).  
The RTB experiment provides a unique opportunity both to assess the effectiveness of 
selling public housing to grant homeownership rights to families in public housing and to 
measure the causal impact of sales of public housing on crime outcomes. From the perspective 
of a policy maker designing a policy that would alter homeownership rights for the general 
population, the parameter estimated here is directly of interest.3 As such, this study 
complements the literature that has examined neighbourhood effects on crime by exploiting 
of a responsible society — proud of the heritage derived from the past, glad to care for it, and eager to give the 
next generation a bit of capital to give them a start.” (See https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105815). 
3 Homeownership is likely to have important implications also for intergenerational mobility, a link that until 
recently has been little analysed (see Blanden and Machin, 2017, and Bell, Blundell and Machin, 2018). 
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the variation in residential locations induced by the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) experiment 
in the United States and by housing policy initiatives in other Western economies.4 
The study of the causal impact of homeownership on crime exploits the unfolding of 
the RTB policy and it is investigated separately in the short-run and in the long-run. To estimate 
the short-run impact of the RTB policy on crime, difference-in-differences specifications 
exploit the differential intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of the RTB policy across localities. RTB 
was introduced as a national policy, but the intensity of treatment across localities varied with 
the predetermined size of the public housing stock. Variations in the size of the public housing 
stock at the start of the RTB policy arise from historical locality-specific factors, and this 
variation is a key part of the research design.  
Estimates reveal sizeable negative short-run effects of increased sales of public housing 
on crime. A one percentage point increase in sales of public housing under the RTB policy 
reduced the local crime rate by approximately 10% in the short-run. The crime reduction 
appears sizeable since the early 1980s and it becomes larger in the second half of the 1980s 
and early 1990s until the end of the Thatcher era. These short-run estimates uncover an 
elasticity of crime with respect to sales of public housing of approximately -0.15, so that a 10 
percent increase in public housing sales reduces crime by around 1.5 percent. This conclusion 
is robust to a battery of additional tests, including variations in the definition of the ITT measure 
and in the specification of the econometric model.  
Mechanisms underlying the findings could work via a number of hypothesised 
channels, including varying local area circumstances, local household compositional changes 
arising from the RTB policy and the potential role of feet-dragging practices in certain localities 
by the opposition Labour party at the time. The findings suggest that none of these factors 
explains the crime reduction generated by the RTB policy. The market value of the RTB sales 
at the onset of the scheme does not predict the evolution of crime either, suggesting that the 
crime reduction attributed to the RTB scheme is genuine and it is not the spurious result of the 
better amenities in areas with more RTB sales.  
4 See, e.g., Katz, Kling and Liebman (2001); Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfield (2001); Kling, Ludwig and Katz 
(2005); Ludwig and Kling (2007); Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007); Sanbonmatsu, Ludwig, Katz, Gennetian, 
Duncan, Kessler, Adam, McDade and Lindau (2011); Ludwig, Duncan, Gennetian, Katz, Kessler, Kling and 
Sanbonmatsu (2013); Sciandra, Sanbonmatsu, Duncan, Gennetian, Katz, Kessler, Kling and Ludwig (2013); 
Damm and Dustmann (2014); Bernasco, de Graaf, Rouwendal and Steenbeek (2017); and Rotger and Galster 
(2019). 
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By contrast, the findings are strongly indicative of a form of ‘endogenous 
gentrification’ whereby local communities were induced to change their behaviour and 
attitudes towards criminal activity as a result of the policy. Indeed, one of the aims of the RTB 
policy was (so to speak) to ‘gentrify’ households endogenously. That is, to give (generally) 
working class households access to an owned asset in order to change their behaviour such as 
taking greater care of and improving the security of their property, and to change their 
economic position by giving these households a collateral asset in financial markets. Hence, 
RTB was viewed as a mechanism for improving and upgrading the economic position of 
households in neighbourhoods that had been previously dominated by public housing.  
The analysis reveals that immediate reductions in crime resulted from the RTB policy. 
These are very unlikely to be attributable to migration, as rules of the RTB scheme prohibited 
immediate purchase and resale of the property, thereby limiting the scope for migration to drive 
our results. In contrast, this finding is consistent with the endogenous gentrification of 
incumbent tenants who purchased a public property under the RTB scheme. The analysis also 
shows that, after purchasing their properties from the local council, incumbent tenants started 
to gentrify their properties by installing double locks on doors and windows, by installing 
burglar alarms and by purchasing insurance for their home contents. Locality-specific estimates 
show that incumbent tenants who bought under the RTB scheme experienced greater crime 
reduction in counties in which the RTB scheme was associated with greater home 
improvement. On the other hand, they did not become more likely to participate in a 
neighbourhood watch scheme, suggesting that the RTB policy did not generate detectable 
changes in social capital. The gentrification of incumbent tenants resulting from the RTB 
policy did not result in increased victimisation of neighbouring public houses, nor in a 
substitution of offenders away from burglary towards other crimes. Results indicate that the 
RTB policy led to significant reductions in burglary but also in theft and handling of stolen 
goods offences as well as in violent crime.  
The paper next moves on to study the long-run persistence of the impact of the RTB 
policy on crime. To estimate the long-run crime effects of the RTB policy, extended crime data 
from 2003 to 2017 are used. Instrumental variable regressions are used to quantify the effects 
of public housing sales from 1980 to 1992 on the change in the crime rate from 2003 to 2017. 
Public housing sales are instrumented using variation in the initial public housing stock, which 
is a valid instrumental variable once the initial level of local crime and contemporaneous 
community characteristics are controlled for. In line with the short-run estimates, long-run 
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estimates show that localities where the RTB policy triggered larger increases in 
homeownership also experienced faster reductions in crime throughout the later period.  
Additional tests reveal that, by 2017, these localities also experienced slower increases 
in house prices. In the standard definition, gentrification arises as middle-class salary earners 
displace lower income or unwaged households as a result of rising house prices. In the case of 
tenure changes induced by RTB sales, the long time horizon of this research is required to 
identify displacement since it takes time before RTB purchasers who are ex-tenants move on, 
sell or rent out their properties, allowing other households to move into the neighbourhood. 
The reduced growth in house prices documented here is inconsistent with this story. In contrast, 
this result mostly reflects the supply-side shock of low-quality properties in the housing market 
induced by the RTB policy. Results also show that, by 2017, Conservative votes increased 
more rapidly in localities most affected by the RTB scheme. As such, these results vindicate 
the Thatcher rationale for the policy and further point towards the ‘endogenous gentrification’ 
of local communities.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the relevant literature 
and describes the RTB policy. In doing so, it seeks to emphasise the scale of public housing in 
the UK by 1980 (in comparison to, say, the United States) and to explain why the spatial 
distribution of public housing does not simply map into low income areas at the start of the 
RTB policy. Data sources are described in Section 3, and the empirical analysis is presented in 
Section 4. Finally, section 5 provides a concluding discussion, including an important word of 
caution in assessing the overall merits of the RTB policy. 
2. Housing and Crime
i. Previous literature
A large spatial crime literature shows that crime rates, especially crimes against property, are 
higher in areas with high concentrations of public housing, even when controlling for other 
salient characteristics of the resident population. This has been a major driver of policy in the 
United States towards the replacement of inner city public housing projects by rent subsidies 
and by shifting tenants to mixed-tenure low housing density urban neighbourhoods (see, for 
example, Schill, 1993, Olsen, 2003, and Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005). A similar association 
between crime and public housing has been observed in the UK (Murie, 1997). More broadly, 
studies show that increased local homeownership rates are associated with a range of spillover 
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effects on the locality, such as lower crime rates, greater civic involvement and improved child 
development (see, for example, DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999, and Haurin, Dietz and 
Weinberg, 2003). 
A well-known difficulty in the large literature on housing tenure type, household 
composition and crime is the range of feedback effects which suggest a number of channels 
exist by which crime affects the composition of neighbourhoods and vice versa. Cullen and 
Levitt (1999) is one of a number of studies that suggest that higher rates of crime, especially in 
inner cities, led to changes in neighbourhood composition by social class and economic status. 
Much of this literature on the ‘flight to the suburbs’ took place against the backdrop of rising 
crime in inner cities in the United States in the 1990s. It has been harder to show that falling 
crime in both earlier and later periods has been the primary driver of the so-called gentrification 
of inner city areas (contrast the findings of McDonald, 1986, with Ellen, Horn and Reed, 2017). 
In addition, there is robust evidence that higher crime is associated with lower property 
values (see Gibbons, 2004, for an illustration using data for London) and this feedback effect 
will induce spatial equilibria of neighbourhood composition when account is taken of not just 
crime rates but other neighbourhood (dis)amenities, transport costs, and so on. For example, 
Owens, Mioduszewski and Bates (2019) show that civil gang injunctions in Southern 
California, a common type of place-based crime control policy in the area, led to approximately 
a 3% decline of residential properties’ values from 2002 to 2015, reflecting individual 
willingness-to-pay for the civil liberties affected by the injunction.5 Morales-Mosquera (2019) 
finds that police station openings generate localized crime reductions and housing values 
increases in three major cities in Colombia.  
A large literature has addressed the basic identification problem of assessing 
neighbourhood effects on crime by exploiting the variation in residential locations generated 
by the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) experiment in the United States. Starting in 1994, the 
MTO experiment assigned housing vouchers via random lottery to thousands of public housing 
residents with children in five cities in the United States to relocate to less-distressed areas. 
Exposure to violence and crime victimization in distressed areas were in fact key reasons for 
low-income families to participate in the MTO experiment (Katz, Kling and Liebman, 2001). 
Katz, Kling and Liebman (2001) show that the MTO experiment improved children’s 
behaviour, adult mental health and perceived safety in treatment group families in Boston, 
5 Grogger (2002) and Ridgeway, Grogger, Moyer and MacDonald (2018) are two earlier studies of the effects 
of gang injunctions on crime. 
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while also reducing exposure to violence and crime victimization. Similar findings emerge in 
Baltimore in the study of Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfield (2001), who find that the MTO 
experiment led to a large reduction in juvenile arrests for violent crimes and to some increase 
in property-crime arrests.  
Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005) document important gender differences in the impact 
of the MTO experiment on crime. While both property and violent crime decreased among 
young women, young men experienced a decrease in violent crime but also an increase in 
property crime a few years after relocating to the new neighbourhood.6 Ludwig and Kling 
(2007) show the importance of racial segregation among other neighbourhood characteristics 
in predicting youth violence, while Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) document the beneficial 
impact of the MTO experiment on the education, risky behaviour and physical health of young 
women. As the opposite effects are found for young men, their findings further suggest that 
young men and women respond differently to similar new neighbourhood circumstances.  
Using more recent data, Sanbonmatsu, Ludwig, Katz, Gennetian, Duncan, Kessler, 
Adam, McDade and Lindau (2011) conclude that the MTO initiative enhanced safety in 
treatment group families, while Ludwig, Duncan, Gennetian, Katz, Kessler, Kling and 
Sanbonmatsu (2013) find gender differences in the impact of the MTO experiment on risky 
behaviour and health of juveniles to persist 10-15 years after the start of the experiment, while 
finding no evidence of persistent reductions in youth violence rates. Sciandra, Sanbonmatsu, 
Duncan, Gennetian, Katz, Kessler, Kling and Ludwig (2013) show little evidence of crime 
reductions in the long run as neighbourhood conditions’ effects of MTO dissipate, reflecting 
that crime is more affected by contemporaneous neighbourhood circumstances than by past 
neighbourhood circumstances.7 To understand why low-income families remain segregated 
into high-poverty areas, Bergman, Chetty, DeLuca, Hendren, Katz and Palmer (2020) 
randomly allocate housing vouchers to 430 recipient families with a child in the Seattle and 
King County areas, concluding that barriers in the housing search process are a critical source 
of residential segregation by income.  
6 The comparative advantage of juveniles relocated from disadvantaged backgrounds in exploiting the available 
property-crime opportunities in their new neighbourhoods and the different ways in which male and female 
juveniles respond to similar new neighbourhood circumstances help the authors rationalize these findings. 
7 The MTO experiment, of course, affected also other dimensions of families’ and children’s lives. Most notably, 
it generated moderate improvements in school quality (Fryer and Katz, 2013), as well as educational and 
economic benefits for young children, including for young boys (Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016). Substantial 
exposure effects of neighbourhoods are also presented in Damm and Dustmann (2014), Bernasco, de Graaf, 
Rouwendal and Steenbeek (2017), Altonji and Mansfield (2018), Chetty and Hendren (2018a), Chetty and 
Hendren (2018b), Rotger and Galster (2019), and Aliprantis and Richter (forthcoming). 
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Our findings on homeownership also relate to Engelhardt, Eriksen, Gale and Mills 
(2010), who analyse an experiment in Oklahoma that subsidised saving for down payments for 
homeownership among a group of low-income individuals using Individual Development 
Accounts (IDA) with randomly assigned treatment status. In their setting, the treatment is the 
offer of matching funding to the IDA, since only a fraction of those who were treated chose to 
take up the offer and to undertake a purchase, and of course, these may not be a random group 
among the treated. They find only weak evidence that homeowners who benefited from the 
policy spent more money on ‘community-facing’ activities such as external improvements to 
their house or involvement in civic events in the 30 months after the take-up of homeownership 
status.  
Recent studies have sought to estimate the effects of homeownership and gentrification 
on crime, focusing on neighbourhood composition effects of policy changes. Aliprantis and 
Hartley (2015) and Sandler (2017) examine the effect on local crime rates in Chicago when 
20,000 units of concentrated high-rise public housing were demolished over the period 1999 
to 2011. Both studies, albeit using slightly different methodologies, track relocated individuals 
to other neighbourhoods, and they conclude that these demolitions led to a net reduction in 
crime rates – primarily violent (gang-related) crime but also theft, robbery and use of guns. 
Chyn (2018) shows the lasting beneficial effects of housing demolitions in Chicago on the 
schooling, professional and criminal trajectories of displaced individuals. Autor, Palmer and 
Pathak (2019) examine the impact of the deregulation of rents in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
on local crime rates. They hypothesize that rent deregulation raised property values and caused 
a differential mix of households to locate across local neighbourhoods, thereby 
disproportionately reducing the rate of property crime in neighbourhoods that had previously 
been subject to rent control. They find a significant reduction in crime overall, which was then 
capitalised into higher property values.8 In a related study, Diamond and McQuade (2019) 
document the crime-reducing effect of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. 
Most of the studies that have examined the effects of gentrification on crime exploit 
policy changes such as the lifting of rent controls and removal of public housing that led low-
income neighbourhoods to increasingly become middle-income neighbourhoods through 
outward migration of low-income households and inward migration of higher-income 
                                                             
8 A recent paper on Britain (Alonso, Andrews and Jorda Gil, 2019) suggests that crime rates were reduced by 
expenditures from the Urban Renewal Fund; although these expenditures did not directly involve changes in 
housing tenure, their idea is closely related to the ‘neighbourhood externalities’ argument. 
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households (see, for example, Autor, Palmer and Pathak, 2019). Studies that have examined 
the impact on crime rates of moving tenants out of public housing into the private sector in the 
United States and experiments that gave households incentives to purchase properties are 
typically based on highly localised data and results are obtained from relatively short time 
periods after implementation of the policy.9  
The main contribution of this study, by contrast, is to estimate the effect on local crime 
rates of increasing homeownership of indigenous communities and inducing a behavioural 
change in these communities. This is a novel means, which has not been documented to date 
and which complements the existing literature, by which gentrification may have contributed 
to the decline in crime in several Western economies in the 1990s and early 2000s. This is also 
an important means by which housing policy may affect crime. The RTB policy constitutes an 
ideal natural experiment to study this, and it is therefore exploited here using large-scale data 
over multiple decades. 
ii. Public Housing in Britain 
The stock of public housing in England and Wales rapidly developed throughout the 
twentieth century over the period from the end of World War I in 1918 up to the start of the 
Right-to-Buy policy in 1980. By 1980, public housing in England and Wales was more 
extensive, more heterogeneous and more spatially dispersed than in the United States.10 These 
spatial outcomes arose from the decisions to rebuild outside as well as within inner city areas 
from the partially random distribution of war destruction and from the differential application 
of planning restrictions across the UK.11 
Figure 1 illustrates housing tenure shares, by tenure types, in England and Wales 
between 1918 and 2011. As illustrated in the Figure, in 1918 more than three-quarters of 
residential housing in England and Wales was privately rented, with public housing accounting 
for only 1% of the housing stock. As a result of a large post-war public sector building program 
and the development of the mortgage market, both private homeownership and public renting 
(primarily from local public authorities) rose steadily until 1980, by which time private renting 
had shrunk to a little over one tenth of housing tenure. While the increase in homeownership 
                                                             
9 The reviewed literature examining the MTO experiment constitutes an exception. 
10  For examples of the heterogeneous nature of public housing across towns, see Table 1 in Disney and Luo 
(2017). 
11  For evidence on the continued important role of planning restrictions on private housing supply in England, 
see Hilber and Vermeulen (2014). 
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prior to 1980 is mostly explained by the development of a formal mortgage market in the 
deepening retail financial sector, two main factors explain the increase in public housing prior 
to 1980. 
First, municipal government investment programs after the World War I. Much of the 
stock of privately-owned housing which was rented out was in very poor conditions post-1918. 
Replacement of the housing stock was hindered by high re-building costs coupled with 
borrowing constraints for many small landlords. Under the Housing and Town Planning Act 
1919, much of the responsibility for replacement housing and slum clearance was taken over 
by local authorities. However, replacement public housing was not simply built in inner-city 
areas where slum clearance had taken place, but also in so-called suburban ‘garden’ estates and 
even ‘garden towns’ located on greenfield sites. Some of these sites were developed as large-
scale public housing projects, often with low-density low-rise properties, others in mixed 
estates with a mixture of public and private housing. Later in the interwar period, as economic 
conditions improved, local authorities reverted to replacing inner-city slums with local high-
rise buildings in the same neighbourhood, while private developers tended to build in suburbs 
and rural areas.12 However planning (zoning) restrictions, which tend to be much tighter in the 
UK than in the United States, limited the growth of private housing in some areas. 
Second, residential rebuilding after the destruction caused by the World War II. A 
further impetus to public housebuilding occurred after 1945. Between 1939 and 1945 around 
four million homes in the UK were destroyed or seriously damaged by bombing. Although 
bombing campaigns were initially targeted at military targets during 1939-45, they gradually 
evolved into area bombing strategies, focusing on cities. However, until near the end of the 
World War II, bombing (by all sides) was notoriously inaccurate, lacking precision instruments 
for target identification. Target visibility relied on key geographical features such as coasts and 
large rivers and towns and cities in such localities were bombed heavily. Other areas remained 
relatively unscathed because of weather conditions, distance, counter-jamming measures, 
‘fake’ fires lit to divert bombers to relatively uninhabited areas and so on.13  
This scattering of war destruction implies that there was a random element to where 
replacement housing was required once the hostilities had ended. As a result of war damage, 
                                                             
12  For further discussion, see https://fet.uwe.ac.uk/conweb/house_ages/council_housing/print.htm and Jones and 
Murie (2006). 
13  There is a vast literature on this. An early volume that revealed efforts to thwart the accuracy of the German 
bombing campaign in Britain is Jones (1978).  
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many areas saw the rapid construction of publicly-owned housing estates to replace damaged 
and destroyed homes. This is illustrated in Figure A1 in Appendix A that uses official Bomb 
Census data from http://bombsight.org/data/sources to show that the location of bombings 
across boroughs in London during the World War II is a significant predictor of where publicly-
owned housing estates were built in the post-war period in London. 
The somewhat random nature of bombing is illustrated by the fact that whilst areas that 
were targeted such as the London Docks contained high-density low income housing, bombs 
also fell heavily in the more affluent boroughs of south and south east London, which thereby 
constructed more public housing after 1945 than equally affluent suburbs to the north of the 
capital. Other areas where major rebuilding took place were also mixed-income communities. 
Nevertheless, after the post-war reconstruction period that lasted well into the 1950s, new 
public properties tended to be built to replace slums in low-income neighbourhoods, often as 
high-rise developments, with private housebuilding being the dominant feature of more 
affluent areas. By 1980, close to one-third of the residential housing stock in England and 
Wales was public housing.   
iii. The “Right to Buy” Policy 
Shortly after Margaret Thatcher’s election as UK Prime Minister, the Housing Act 1980 
introduced a statutory Right to Buy (RTB) for public tenants with at least 3 years’ tenure in 
their public house – ‘statutory’ in the sense that the policy had to be implemented by all local 
councils (previously a few Conservative councils had allowed their tenants to buy their public 
property, generally at market price). The RTB policy allowed tenants to buy their properties at 
substantial discounts to market value ranging from 33% with three years’ residence to a 
maximum of 50% after 20 years’ residence. Local councils were also obliged to make 
mortgages available to would-be purchasers, although this feature became less pertinent as 
capital markets were liberalised during the 1980s. The discount on the sale price would be 
repayable if the property was resold within five years of an RTB purchase, although a 
purchased property could be rented out.  
There were additional constraints in the 1980 legislation, particularly in relation to the 
sale of publicly-owned apartments, but these too were relaxed in the mid-1980s. Purchase of 
public housing under RTB also became more attractive with later efforts to raise heavily-
12 
 
subsidised rents on public tenancies towards ‘market’ levels.14 Figure 2 indicates the pattern of 
sales under the RTB policy in England (the other UK nations had similar patterns – indeed the 
large stock of public houses in Scotland was sold even more rapidly, leading to a blanket ban 
on further sales by the Scottish government some decades later).  The two peaks in sales in the 
1980s are associated with the introduction of the RTB policy and its liberalisation in the mid-
1980s; thereafter with the better-quality tenants (and public housing) having moved into the 
private sector, the rate of sales declines.  
The Thatcher era ended in 1992 and the incoming Labour government in 1997 did not 
attempt to reverse the policy completely but did tighten eligibility conditions, limit access to 
publicly-provided mortgages and impose caps on the maximum discounts in some areas where 
sales had diminished the public housing stock quickly (since local authorities still had a 
statutory responsibility to house homeless families). On the other hand, the government also 
introduced a similar, but less generous version of RTB known as ‘Right to Acquire’, which 
allowed tenants in some cases to purchase public housing (typically managed by ‘arms length’ 
housing associations and charities rather than directly by local public authorities). This led to 
a brief upsurge in sale volumes, as illustrated in Figure 2, although sales continued in any event 
as public tenants acquired sufficient years’ residency in their property to be eligible for the 
RTB scheme. 
Not surprisingly, RTB purchases were selective, both by household type and by quality 
of property. For example, in Derby, a prosperous town in mid-England which has traditionally 
specialised in high-end manufacturing since at least the 1920s, over 80% of the large stock of 
public properties in 1980 were in the form of detached, semi-detached or terraced housing in 
suburbs, and less than 20% in the form of (mostly) high-rise apartments in the inner city. By 
1991, 27% of Derby’s stock of public housing had been sold off, with apartments now 
constituting nearly 30% of the residual stock.  
In contrast, in Hackney, an inner London borough, in 1980 around 80% of the public 
housing stock was in apartments, mostly in high-rise estates. By 1991 most of the non-
apartment stock in Hackney had been sold off but the overall stock of public housing had 
increased because the local council had constructed or purchased further apartments. RTB 
purchasers themselves were typically older, they had higher income, and they were less likely 
to be unemployed (Gregg, Machin and Manning, 2004). Hence, sales of public houses were 
                                                             
14  The economic incentives implied by these various policies are explored at some length in Disney and Luo 
(2017) but not considered in detail here. 
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evidently non-random and related with the local crime rates, resulting in a well-known 
endogeneity issue in the regression analysis that is addressed empirically in Section 4. 
 
3. Data 
The empirical analysis combines two main data sources, both at annual frequency. Housing 
data are provided by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA). The 
data are provided at the Local Authority (LA) level for the 314 LAs in England and Wales in 
1980.15 The data include details of the composition of the residential housing stock (owned, 
privately rented and public housing) and the number of sales under the Right-to-Buy (RTB) 
scheme in each year. LAs had a statutory requirement to report RTB sales to CIPFA and 
provide details of the revenue flow received from the sales.  
Two sources of crime data complement the housing data. The short-run analysis, which 
covers the period 1975 to 1992, uses administrative crime records collected by the police and 
published annually by the UK Home Office in Criminal Statistics. This period spans five years 
prior to the introduction of the RTB policy in 1980, through to the end of the period of 
Thatcher-led Conservative governments in 1992. These data are provided at the Police Force 
Area (PFA) geography, a geographic unit that sits above and nests LAs.16 With the sole 
exception of London’s financial district, commonly known as “the City of London” and which 
constitutes an independent PFA, data are used for all 42 PFAs that exist in England and 
Wales.17  
The long-run analysis, which covers the period 2003 to 2017, draws upon 
administrative crime records at the LA level recorded by the police and published online by 
the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS).18 The City of London PFA is also excluded from 
the long-run analysis. For both the short-run and long-run analyses, the measures of crime used 
in the empirical analysis are the numbers of recorded offences of different crime categories per 
population. Thus, the data capture incidents of crime recorded and classified by all UK local 
                                                             
15 The number of LAs changes over time due to some mergers and due to boundary redrawing. There were 314 
LAs in England and Wales in 1980 at the onset of the RTB policy. 
16 For example, London LAs sit within the Metropolitan Police PFA.  
17 The City of London constitutes an additional PFA that is independent from the rest of London. However, this 
PFA is excluded from this analysis because most property in the area is non-residential, hardly anybody lives 
there and consequently few RTB sales took place there. 
18 The long-run analysis starts in 2003 because there was a very substantial change in reporting rules in 2002 in 
the UK that had different effects across PFAs and crime types. Thus, it is not possible to use police recorded 
crime data before and after 2002 in the same analysis. 
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police forces. The data contain offence rates for five crime categories: property crime, defined 
as the sum of burglary and theft and handling of stolen goods offences, and violent crime, 
defined as the sum of violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery offences.  
The LA-level housing data were combined with the crime data to create two data sets 
for the analysis. For the short-run analysis, running from 1975 to 1992, the LA-level crime data 
were aggregated at the PFA level using the ONS Open Geography database, and then joined to 
the PFA-level crime data. The construction of the short-run panel is not affected by changes in 
LA geographical boundaries, as in all cases these occur within PFA units. Hence, a balanced 
panel of 42 PFAs spanning 18 years was obtained, with the PFA-year being the unit of analysis. 
For the long-run analysis (2003 to 2017), which uses a long-difference model, 
observations of the change in crime measured at the LA level for the period 2003-2017 were 
joined with observations of total RTB sales, also at the LA level, for the period 1980-1992. Not 
all observations could be joined due to changes in LA geographical boundaries that preclude a 
one-to-one mapping between LAs in the earlier and later period. This analysis is therefore 
based on 293 observations that could be joined between the earlier and latter periods.   
These data sources were complemented with administrative records of local area 
conditions. In the short run analysis, data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) and the 
Department for Employment were used to calculate local area conditions from 1975 to 1992 in 
each PFA. In the long run analysis, local area conditions at the LA level from the Annual 
Population Survey (APS) complement the housing and crime data.19 
i. Summary Statistics 
Summary data for the composition of the housing stock in 1980, just prior to the RTB 
policy start, are provided in the first four rows of Table 1. On average, 27.2% of all residential 
properties in a PFA were public housing, equating to approximately 14,000 individual 
properties per LA, and roughly 1.5% of these were sold under the RTB scheme from October 
to December 1980 in the first three months of the policy.20 The distribution of the public 
housing rate, as well as of public housing sales in 1980, are heterogeneous across PFAs. The 
data show a quite high standard deviation of public housing stock as a proportion of the 
residential stock (the standard deviation, shown in Table 1, is 8.6%) as well as some outlier 
                                                             
19 Additional details of the data used in the empirical analysis and instructions for data access are provided in 
the Appendix. 
20 Our data are for England and Wales. The higher proportion of the public housing stock at the start of RTB for 
the UK arises from the initial high levels of public houses in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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LAs – in 10% of LAs, public housing accounted for more than one third of the residential 
housing stock.  
Figure A2 Panel A in Appendix A illustrates the distribution of public housing across 
LAs in 1980 (expressed as a percentage of the residential housing stock). Panel B illustrates 
the distribution of public housing in absolute terms and Panel C shows the distribution of 
residential housing in absolute terms. Similarly, Figure A3 Panel A in Appendix A illustrates 
the distribution of public housing sales across LAs in the 1980s-90s (expressed as a percentage 
of the residential housing stock in 1980). Panel B illustrates the distribution of public housing 
sales in the 1980s-90s in absolute terms and Panel C shows the distribution of public housing 
sales across LAs in the 1980s-90s (expressed as a percentage of the public housing stock in 
1980). All distributions in Figures A2 and A3 have a long right tail, further illustrating the 
uneven distribution of the public housing stock, the public housing sales, the total residential 
stock and the ratios of these across LAs in 1980.  
The remaining rows of Table 1 provide summary data for crime rates and other 
covariates in 1980. Crime rates are measured as cases per individuals. Thus, Table 1 shows that 
4.5 criminal offences per 100 individuals were recorded on average in a PFA in 1980. Total 
crime is defined as the sum of property crime and violent crime, and these measures of crime 
are the key outcomes of interest here.21 Property Crime, defined as the sum of burglary and 
theft and handling of stolen goods’ offences, is overwhelmingly the most common category of 
crime in 1980. Only the most serious types of violent offences, such as homicide, aggravated 
assault, sexual offences and robberies, were recorded and published by the Home Office since 
the 1970s in England and Wales. Minor violent offences only started to be recorded in the UK 
in the early 2000s. Thus, violent crime is defined here as the sum of serious violence against 
the person, sexual offences and robbery.  
Table 1 also shows three additional variables which are used as covariates in regression 
models: the local log real hourly wage at the 25th percentile of the distribution, the local log 
unemployment rate and the local share of 15-24 years olds in the population in the PFA. Since 
potential offenders are likely to earn low wages and have little labour market attachment 
(Machin and Meghir, 2004), the 25th percentile of log wages and log unemployment are likely 
to be relevant features of the labour market in the determination of criminal activity. Finally, 
Table 1 also suggests that approximately 16% of the overall population is aged 15 to 24. Since 
                                                             
21 The analysis does not include drugs offences as no data on drugs offences in England and Wales was collected 
and published by the UK Home Office for the period of this study. 
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the likelihood to commit crime is observed almost universally to be highest in the late teens 
and then decrease later in life (Quetelet, 1831, and Landersø, Nielsen and Simonsen, 2016), 
the fraction of individuals aged 15 to 24 in the population is also likely to be a relevant 
determinant of the local criminal activity. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
i. Public housing and crime in the initial conditions 
The analysis of the relationship between density of public housing and crime rates prior to the 
introduction of the Right-to-Buy (RTB) policy appears as a natural starting point in the 
empirical analysis. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the public housing rate (the 
percentage share of public housing in the residential housing stock in the PFA) and the crime 
rate for the 42 PFAs included in the analysis in 1980. A clear positive association appears 
between the concentrations of public housing and crime across PFAs in England and Wales, 
with the size of the dots on the scatter plot illustrating the PFA’s population size in 1980. The 
positive relationship between the public housing rate and the crime rate in Figure 3 is 
statistically significant at all conventional levels. Using the same data, an OLS regression of 
the following form was also estimated: 
                                              = α + β + β + ϵ                                                (1) 
where  is the crime rate in PFA ;  is the public housing stock as a percentage of the 
residential housing stock;  is a vector of PFA level variables and ϵ  is the error term. Equation 
(1) was estimated for total crime, as well as separately for property crime and violent crime. 
Estimates of Equation (1) are shown in Table 2. The Table shows estimates of crime as 
a function of the public housing stock (expressed as a percentage of the residential stock). 
Columns (2), (4) and (6) additionally control for the log real hourly wage at the 25th percentile 
of the distribution within the PFA, the log unemployment rate in the PFA and the share of 15-
24 year olds in the population in the PFA. Public housing appears positively and precisely 
correlated with all crime outcomes. The coefficient on total crime in column (2) of 0.063 
implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the size of the public housing stock (measured as 
a percentage of the residential stock) in the PFA is associated with an increase in the crime rate 
of 0.06 units. The positive correlation between public housing and criminality is not affected 
by the inclusion of local area variables in Equation (1). 
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ii. Identification issues 
The primary object of this study is to quantify the causal impact of homeownership on 
crime rates. In the empirical setting of this study, the Right-to-Buy (RTB) policy can be 
interpreted as a relaxation of a supply constraint on available property for homeownership, by 
allowing public housing tenants to purchase their homes at a subsidy. Of course, this policy 
does not directly generate a pure natural experiment in observed RTB sales for at least two 
reasons. First, there may be important time-varying omitted factors that drive both the decision 
by a tenant to purchase the house and the local crime rate. Second, RTB sales are a result of 
demand for public housing purchases together with the local supply of housing for sale. With 
demand being determined, at least in part, by local crime rates, OLS estimates of the 
relationship between crime rate and public housing sales will suffer from endogeneity bias. It 
is very likely that the decision by the tenant to purchase the house may itself be partly 
determined by the level and dynamics of local crime. Indeed, unsurprisingly, a negative 
relationship appears between crime rates and public housing sales in 1980 in Figure A4 in 
Appendix A, further suggesting that RTB sales were not orthogonal to crime rates at the onset 
of the RTB policy.  
iii. Short-run estimates 
a. Empirical strategy 
Our empirical strategy exploits two approaches to estimating the effect of sales of 
public housing on crime rates that isolate supply-side variation in exposure to the RTB policy. 
This variation arises from differences across LAs in the size of their public housing stock, and 
hence potential exposure to RTB sales. The analysis of the short-run impact of public housing 
sales on crime defines a series of difference-in-differences specifications whereby the RTB 
sales for the first three months of RTB from October to December 1980 by PFA are used to 
proxy the Intention-To-Treat (ITT) intensity of the RTB treatment at the PFA level. The 
rationale behind this specification is that the introduction of the RTB policy differentially 
affected localities due to the differing levels of the initial public housing stock – and in turn the 
differing degrees of RTB sales. Hence, the national level policy, albeit introduced uniformly 
across localities in 1980, resulted in different intensity of treatment according to the 
composition of the local housing stock, which was determined by the historical factors.22  
                                                             
22 The sensitivity of the estimates to extending this time window to end of 1981 or end of 1982, as suggested by 




Public housing sales under the RTB policy began in most LAs in October 1980 (the 
1980 Housing Act was passed on 8 August, with most LAs starting to process applications for 
public housing purchases soon thereafter). Figure 2 shows that the RTB policy resulted in an 
initial peak in public housing sales from October 1980 to 1982, after which RTB sales 
continued at a slower pace. The initial shock of RTB sales in 1980 is therefore exploited 
empirically in the econometric analysis. Figure 4 illustrates a strong positive correlation 
between the percentage of the public housing stock in the PFA which was sold-off in 1980 (on 
the x-axis) and the percentage sold-off between 1980 and 1992 (on the y-axis). Therefore, while 
RTB public housing sales by 1992 may be the endogenous result of the evolution of crime post 
1980, and thereby result in a well-known problem of reverse causation in our estimates, the 
public housing sales in 1980 constitute an ITT proxy that strongly predicts the actual intensity 
of the treatment by 1992 at the PFA level.  
For this analysis, data on crime rates, RTB sales and local area are used from 1975 to 
1992. The estimating difference-in-differences specification can be expressed as follows: 
       , =  αi+αt + ∗ , + ∗ + ∗ , ∗ + +  ,           (2) 
where ,  is the crime rate in PFA i in each year t from 1975 to 1992, αi is a set of PFA fixed 
effects and αt is a set of year fixed effects. ,  is a measure of RTB sales of public housing 
in 1980 (expressed as a proportion of the public housing stock in 1980), defined both as a 
continuous variable and as a binary variable indicating if RTB sales in PFA i were greater than 
or equal to the median value of RTB sales at the national level in 1980. Post is a dummy 
variable that takes up value 1 starting from 1980. , the coefficient associated with the 
interaction between ,  and Post, is the coefficient of interest, as it retrieves the causal 
impact of the initial RTB-induced shock to homeownership on crime. A negative coefficient 
associated with  would imply that PFAs that experienced greater RTB sales of public housing 
in 1980 experienced lower relative crime rates by 1992 due to the RTB scheme. This parameter 
is directly of interest to a policy maker wishing to modify homeownership rights for the general 
population.  
The causal interpretation of  crucially relies on the absence of differential pre-
treatment trends between PFAs exposed to different degrees of RTB sales in 1980. Insofar as 
RTB sales in 1980 do not predict crime trends prior to the RTB policy, then  can be 
interpreted as the causal impact of the RTB policy on crime. The potential presence of 
differential pre-treatment crime trends between PFAs that experienced different degrees of 
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RTB sales is tested and results are presented below. Finally,  is a vector of local controls and 
 is the error term. Due to the small number of clusters (42 PFAs) in the analysis, p-values 
were derived for inference from Wild Cluster Bootstrap estimation with standard errors 
clustered at the PFA level (see Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008).  
b. Short run: results 
Table 3 presents unconditional difference-in-differences estimates based upon the 
dichotomous treatment version of Equation (2) (calculated absent any of the labour market 
controls or fixed effects stated in the equation). In the calculations, PFAs are split into two 
groups by the magnitude of , , in which the above-or-equal-to-median group is described 
as the ‘treatment’ group and the below median group is described as the ‘control’ group. For 
each crime type, Columns 1 and 2 state the pre-1980 average crime rate in the PFA, the post-
1980 average crime rate in the PFA and the within-PFA post-pre difference. Column 3 shows 
the pre-1980 and post-1980 differences between the treatment and control PFAs. Column 4 
shows the unconditional difference-in-differences estimate and column (5) shows the 
unconditional difference-in-differences estimate deflated by the mean level of crime in the 
control group prior to 1980 in percent terms (the unconditional percent effect). For each crime 
type, the unconditional difference-in-differences coefficient estimate is negative and precisely 
defined. On average, overall crime rates from 1980 to 1992 were roughly 16% lower in PFAs 
that experienced RTB sales greater or equal to the national median in 1980. In these PFAs, 
average property crime rates were 15% lower than in other PFAs. Violent crime was 33% lower 
in treatment PFAs as well. These unconditional estimates suggest that sales of public housing 
under the RTB scheme may have induced a reduction in crime rates in England and Wales. 
Tables 4 and 5 subject these results to a more rigorous econometric specification. Table 
4 shows results based upon the dichotomous treatment version of ,  in Equation (2), 
while Table 5 shows results based upon the continuous treatment version of , . Both 
Tables are organised in the same way. In both Tables, estimates are split into panels A-C by 
crime type. The models in Columns (1) and (4) report the estimates of , the coefficient 
associated with the interaction between ,  and Post, whereas the models in Columns (2), 
(3), (5) and (6) show the results separately for the first five years of the RTB policy, 1980-84, 
and for the subsequent years, 1985-92. The model specifications in Columns (1) to (3) include 
PFA fixed effects and year fixed effects, while the models in Columns (4) to (6) additionally 
20 
 
include local area variables (log of the unemployment rate, log of real hourly earnings at the 
25th percentile of the distribution, and the fraction of 15-24 year olds in the population). 
 Coefficient estimates in Tables 4 and 5 show negative and precisely defined effects of 
RTB sales on each measure of crime, with little variation across model specifications. The total 
crime estimates in Panel A of Table 4 return coefficients in the range of -0.008 to -0.009, 
implying that PFAs that experienced RTB sales greater or equal to the national median in 1980 
experienced between 16% and 18% lower crime rates from 1980 to 1992. When broken down 
between the years immediately after 1980 and later years, results suggest that a sizeable crime 
reduction of approximately 10% was already visible in 1980-84, and the reduction became 
even larger ranging from 20% to 22% in subsequent years.  
Estimates in Panel A of Table 5, where a continuous measure of ITT treatment is used, 
imply that a 1 percentage point increase in RTB sales measured as a proportion of the public 
housing stock in the PFA in 1980 led to a decrease in crime rates of approximately 10%. As 
shown in Table 1, on average across PFAs, 1.5% of the public housing stock was sold in 1980 
under the RTB scheme, implying that a one percentage point increase corresponds roughly to 
a 66% increase from the sample mean. Thus, these estimates uncover an elasticity of crime 
with respect to sales of public housing of approximately -0.15, implying that a 10 percent 
increase in public housing sales reduces crime by around 1.5 percent. When broken down 
between the years immediately after 1980 and later years, a one percentage point increase in 
RTB sales coincides with a sizeable 8% crime reduction in 1980-84, which becomes larger at 
12% in later years.  
Estimates for property crime in Panel B of Tables 4 and 5 tell a similar story. PFAs that 
experienced RTB sales greater or equal to the national median in 1980 experienced between 
15% and 17% lower property crime rates from 1980 to 1992. Estimates in Table 5 show that a 
1 percentage point increase in RTB sales measured as a proportion of the public housing stock 
in the PFA in 1980 led to a decrease in property crime rates ranging from 9% to 11%. Property 
crime decreased significantly in 1980-84, and the crime reduction became even steeper in 
1985-92. Finally, estimates for violent crime in Panel C show that PFAs that experienced RTB 
sales greater or equal to the national median in 1980 experienced roughly 33% lower violent 
crime rates from 1980 to 1992. Table 5 shows that a 1 percentage point increase in RTB sales 
measured as a proportion of the public housing stock in the PFA in 1980 led to a decrease in 
violent crime rates of approximately 13%. In addition, violent crime decreased both in the 
1980-84 and in the 1985-92 periods, with a steeper reduction in later years. 
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The causal interpretation of these estimates crucially relies on the absence of 
differential pre-treatment crime trends between PFAs that were exposed to a different degree 
to the RTB sales in 1980. Figures 5-7 show event-study estimates for each of our crime 
outcomes of interest. On each plot, a similar equation specification as in column (1) in Table 5 
was estimated, standard errors were clustered at the PFA level and Wild Cluster Bootstrap 
techniques were used again for inference due to the small number of clusters. Two key facts 
emerge from Figures 5-7. First, the figures show there to be no differential pre-treatment trends 
between PFAs that received different exposures to the RTB scheme. In other words, the share 
of public housing sold in 1980, in the first three months of the RTB scheme, does not predict 
crime trends across PFAs prior to 1980. This implies that any post-1980 deviation from the 
existing trend that is predicted by the share of public housing sold in 1980 can be interpreted 
as the impact of the RTB scheme on crime.  
Second, estimates in Figure 5 show a reduction in crime rates among PFAs that 
experienced greater RTB sales in 1980. The crime-reducing effects of RTB sales appear 
sizeable and statistically significant in every year from 1980 onwards, an effect mostly 
attributable to the reduction in property crime, which is shown in Figure 6, and only marginally 
to the reduction in violent crime, which is shown in Figure 7. Interestingly, these Figures 
confirm that a sizeable crime-reducing effect of the RTB scheme appears since 1980-84, 
namely since the first years of the RTB scheme, with the effect being driven by the reduction 
in property crime. By this time, no one who purchased a property under the RTB scheme could 
have possibly resold it while continuing to benefit from the large discounts offered by the 
Thatcher-led government under the RTB scheme. Indeed, as explained above, the discount on 
the sale price would be repayable if the property was resold within five years of a RTB 
purchase. Thus, these crime reductions are unlikely to result from the practice of reselling 
properties previously bought under the RTB scheme to incomers that are more affluent. If the 
“migration-based” gentrification of certain areas of the country was the underlying mechanism 
driving these crime reductions, significance in the estimates should not appear until at least 
1985, when the first properties bought under the RTB scheme in 1980 could be resold without 
having to renounce the RTB discounts. However, this is not what is found here. A crime 
reduction appears from 1980, a result that is rather consistent with the “endogenous” 
gentrification of indigenous tenants and behavioural changes within the local communities that 
were more exposed to the provisions of the RTB scheme. The precision of the estimates falls 
towards the end of the study period, though point estimates remain constant from 1984 
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onwards. The loss in precision towards the end of the study period is best explained by the fact 
that the proxy used here for the intensity of the treatment was calculated in 1980, and, by the 
early 1990s, this proxy of the intensity of the treatment becomes a noisier predictor of crime 
compared to the estimates from the 1980s.  
c. Robustness and Sensitivity Tests 
The findings in Tables 3-5 and Figures 5-7 were subject to a variety of robustness tests. 
First, one may worry that this analysis is spuriously picking up some other PFA-specific trends 
that coincided with both greater RTB sales and greater crime reduction. If this was the case, 
then the observed crime reduction in some parts of the country would be erroneously attributed 
to the RTB scheme. To ensure that the results presented so far are not capturing some 
underlying crime trends that coincided with RTB sales in the 1980s, a PFA-specific time trend 
was added to the specification in column (1) in Table 5. Thus, each PFA-specific trend controls 
for the underlying trend in crime since before the RTB scheme was introduced. The only 
variation left is therefore from departures from the linear trend of the demeaned data that were 
induced by the RTB scheme. If the RTB had not had any real effect on crime, and the analysis 
was just picking up some underlying trend in crime here, there would be no departures from 
the linear trend and the estimated RTB coefficient would go to zero when the PFA-specific 
trends are added to the estimating equation. This analysis further confirms the conclusion that 
the RTB scheme led to a reduction in crime rates, as a statistically significant crime-reducing 
effect of the RTB policy is found also in this case.  
Second, robustness of the estimates to the treatment period used to define the ITT 
intensity was also tested. Results were estimated again using RTB sales from 1980-81, not just 
1980, and a significant reduction in crime of approximately 8% as a result of the RTB scheme 
is found again (the estimated coefficient being equal to -0.004 and the Wild Cluster Bootstrap 
p-value being equal to 0.000 regardless of the set of additional covariates added to the 
estimating equation).  
Third, the political composition of the PFA in the local elections in 1977, the latest local 
elections prior to the election of Margaret Thatcher as UK Prime Minister in 1979, was also 
considered in the analysis. Indeed, one may worry that the de facto supply-side availability of 
public housing for RTB sales might have differed by local political control. If, for example, 
pro-Thatcher Conservative controlled LAs were more willing to fulfil their statutory 
responsibility to process sales through faster processing (or, potentially, be more likely to 
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advertise and encourage the possibility locally), then this omitted confound might co-determine 
RTB sales and crime. However, a scatter plot in Figure A5 in Appendix A suggests no 
correlation between the conservative vote share within the PFA and our measure of ITT 
treatment, namely public housing sales as a percentage of the public housing stock in 1980. 
Estimates of the impact of the RTB scheme on crime were also produced when a set of 
interactions between the Conservative vote share within the PFA in the 1977 local elections 
and year fixed effects were added to the econometric specification.23 Results are unchanged 
with the inclusion of this additional variable, which suggests that our results are not caused by 
Labour controlled LAs opposing this policy for political reasons while facing greater local 
crime rates. This holds true regardless of whether local area variables are included in the 
analysis and regardless of which years of RTB sales are used to define the ITT status. 
One additional concern may be that the reduction in crime rates observed in areas with 
greater RTB sales in 1980 may both reflect some underlying trends in local labour markets. If, 
for example, people bought more properties under the RTB scheme in areas that faced more 
favourable labour market prospects, and these same areas then experienced reduced criminality 
thanks to the improved labour market circumstances, then the reduction in crime observed in 
Tables 3-5 and Figures 5-7 would be erroneously attributed to the RTB scheme. Models to test 
for effects of RTB sales on local labour market conditions were therefore estimated and results 
are displayed in Table 6. Whether the unemployment rate or the 25th percentile real hourly 
earnings are modelled as dependent variable, no evidence appears that the RTB sales in 1980 
predicted the evolution of local labour market conditions in the 1980s and early 1990s. These 
results mitigate the concern that our estimates might be picking up the effect of other local area 
circumstances that interacted with public housing sales over time in the 1980s.  
The RTB sales in 1980 do not even seem to predict the local fraction of 15-24 year olds 
in the population in the 1980s and early 1990s, a relevant finding that further suggests that 
migration and a compositional change in the local population do not seem to be the key 
mechanisms at play here. If a “migration-based” gentrification was behind the main results of 
this paper, the RTB sales would predict the composition of the local population in the 1980s 
and 1990s. If, for example, all RTB purchasers had rented out their properties to students right 
after purchasing them (and this was the true driver of the crime reduction in Tables 4 and 5), 
then RTB sales should be a positive predictor of the fraction of 15-24 year olds in the 
                                                             
23 The Conservative vote share is the share of Conservative votes in all votes cast in the parliamentary 
constituencies nested within the PFA.  
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population. However, this is not what is found here, further suggesting it was rather a 
behavioural change in the local community to drive the observed decrease in crime. 
One further concern may be that initial RTB sales, which are used here to define the 
ITT status, may capture differential local amenities across regions in England and Wales. The 
initial uptake of the RTB scheme may have been greater in areas with “better-quality” public 
housing. Similarly, one may worry that in 1980 only the “well-off” public tenants were able to 
exploit the RTB scheme and purchase their houses, while “the very poor” were left behind. 
Both these scenarios would imply that, in the short run analysis, our proxy for the intensity of 
exposure to the RTB scheme (the fraction of public housing sold in 1980) may be picking up 
other relevant socioeconomic components of communities. If our proxy for the intensity of 
exposure to the RTB scheme was concentrated among better-off areas or individuals, the crime-
reducing effect that is observed may not be due to the sales of public housing, but rather due to 
the fact that we are not comparing like-with-like. 
To test for the possibility that RTB sales grew faster in areas with greater-quality public 
housing, the main model was re-estimated and the treatment variable replaced with the value 
of RTB sales in place of the share of public properties sold. The result of this exercise is shown 
in column (4) of Table 6. When crime is regressed on the average (log) value of RTB 
transactions in the first year of the RTB scheme, the estimated coefficient appears small in 
magnitude, as well as in percent terms, and very statistically insignificant. Thus, unlike the 
incidence of RTB sales, the value of RTB sales does not predict the evolution of crime. This 
conclusion is robust to the set of controls added to the estimating equation (fixed effects only; 
fixed effects and local area variables; or fixed effects, local area variables and PFA-specific 
time trends). In sum, the incidence, not the average value, of RTB sales predicts the reduction 
in crime since the 1980s.  
Finally, one may worry that the RTB scheme may have coincided with differential 
policing strategies across regions and that this may have resulted in differential crime detection 
rates across regions. If, for example, fewer police officers were deployed in areas with greater 
RTB sales in 1980, our findings may reflect the lower crime detection rates of the police in 
these areas rather than a genuine reduction in crime. Availability of data on the number of 
officers employed in each PFA since 1975 allowed us to estimate the impact of the RTB scheme 
on police deployment. This is a further test of whether indeed the RTB scheme made some 
areas of the country safer, or whether it coincided with a decrease in police deployment. To 
examine this idea, the dependent variable in the difference-in-differences specification was 
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replaced with the log number of police officers deployed by the PFA. Results are displayed in 
column (5) of Table 6, and the coefficient of interest is economically small and not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the greater exposure to the RTB scheme of some PFAs did not 
coincide with differential policing strategies. In turn, this mitigates the concern that differential 
policing strategies and crime detection rates across regions may have coincided with the RTB 
scheme, and further suggests that our main results reveal the genuine reduction in criminality 
generated by the RTB scheme. 
d. Homeownership and Behavioural Change  
Did the RTB policy induce indigenous local communities to gentrify their properties? 
One possibility is that home upgrading by purchasers under the RTB scheme explains the 
observed reduction in crime (absent any clear migration, labour market or amenity differential 
between areas that were exposed to differing degrees to the RTB policy). The British Crime 
Survey (BCS) 1988 contains a rich set of variables concerning homeownership and crime.24 
Based on the information contained in the BCS 1988, it was possible to define a treatment 
group of incumbent tenants who had previously rented from the council, then subsequently 
purchased, the property in which they currently reside; and a control group of council rental 
tenants who stated that they currently intend to buy the public property in which they reside 
within two years. This provides a natural comparison group against which to estimate the 
effects of purchase on behavioural change to build at least strongly suggestive evidence for the 
effects of the policy. 
 Table 7 shows a comparison between these two groups of observably similar 
individuals. Panel A shows unconditional OLS estimates, thus providing a simple comparison 
of the means between these two groups. OLS estimates in Panel B were derived controlling for 
gender, ethnicity, a quadratic of age, past experiences of burglary victimization in the property 
of residence, type of property (e.g., flat or house), no. rooms of the property, household income 
band, employment status and county fixed effects. Thus, while self-selection into the treatment 
group is a possibility, controlling for this large set of observables and restricting the treatment 
and control groups to incumbent individuals that only seem to differ in their timing of 
willingness to purchase their property from the council within two years should mitigate the 
concern that self-selection is driving our results here. To be consistent with all other results at 
PFA level, standard errors were clustered at the county level, the closest geography to a PFA 
                                                             
24 The same detail of information is not available from any other BCS survey from 1982 to 1992, when the short 
run analysis ends. 
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that was available. As respondents are drawn from 52 counties, Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-
values were estimated again as in all the analysis discussed above. 
The results in Table 7 show that incumbent tenants who bought from the council were 
significantly more likely to install double locks to outside doors, to install locks in windows 
and have the contents of their home insured against theft. The same individuals were also 
significantly more likely to install burglar alarms, a relatively rare security device in England 
and Wales in 1988. Finally, these individuals were not more likely to join a neighbourhood 
watch scheme, a community-based crime prevention measure in which neighbours help each 
other in a form of informal guardianship. The comparison group here is always council tenants 
who intended to buy the property in which they resided in 1988 within two years. The 
comparison of Panel A and Panel B shows that these conclusions are valid regardless of 
whether the set of controls described above is included in the estimating equation or not.  
Additional analysis using the BCS data corroborates our main findings for the effects 
of the RTB policy on crime. Table A1 in the Appendix uses the BCS data to compare treated 
versus control group individuals and shows that, in 1988, treatment group homeowners 
reported between 20% and 25% less cases of crime victimisation since the beginning of 1987 
than control group council tenants. Columns (1) and (3) show that this holds true regardless of 
whether county fixed effects are controlled for. Column (5) of the Table also shows results 
when county fixed effects are replaced by the share of treatment group homeowners in the 
county.25 The coefficient associated with homeownership under the RTB scheme remains 
negative and statistically significant. In contrast, the share of treatment group homeowners in 
the county itself does not predict crime victimisation. Thus, while reiterating that the crime 
reductions in Tables 3-5 and Figures 5-7 are indeed driven by RTB sales, these results also 
show that RTB sales did not lead to increased crime victimisation of neighbouring public 
houses.  
Figure 8 shows county-specific estimates of the correlation between RTB sales and 
crime victimisation plotted against county-specific estimates of the correlation between RTB 
sales and home improvement. A linear function fitting the distribution of county-specific 
estimates is also shown. This appears negative and statistically significant, showing that 
                                                             
25 For each respondent, this share was calculated at the county level leaving out the respondent herself/himself 
from the calculation. 
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incumbent tenants who bought under the RTB scheme experienced greater crime reduction in 
counties in which the RTB scheme was associated with greater home improvement.  
The low-income homeownership experiment in Oklahoma investigated by Engelhardt 
et al (2010) showed little or no significant evidence of home improvements of this sort 
subsequent to purchase, but that study covered a relatively short time interval post-purchase 
and take-up of the subsidy was relatively low. In contrast, the results in Table 7 for doors’ and 
windows’ locks and burglar alarms are consistent with the notion that homeownership led 
people to gentrify their properties. Homeownership may have given greater access to loans and 
financial markets in general, and the result for theft insurance plausibly reflects this. These 
results help rationalise in particular the reduction in property crime. Controlling for past 
experiences of burglary victimisation also mitigates the concern that RTB purchasers may have 
experienced greater crime victimisation in the past and that this may drive the results in Table 
7. In contrast, since homeowners were no more likely to join a neighbourhood watch scheme, 
no evidence appears here that the RTB induced greater investment in social capital in local 
communities where RTB unfolded more intensively. 
Table A1 in the Appendix suggested that no crime displacement occurred from public 
houses sold under the RTB scheme to neighbouring public houses not yet sold under the RTB 
scheme. However, one may also worry that the property crime reduction in Tables 4 and 5 and 
Figure 6 is entirely driven by reductions in burglary, with potential thieves shifting to other 
thefts in the street. Table 8 shows the results of our analysis in Tables 4 and 5 broken down by 
crime categories. Results are displayed separately for the crime categories that constitute our 
measure of property crime, namely burglary and theft and handling of stolen goods, as well as 
for the crime categories that constitute our measure of violent crime, namely violence against 
the person, sexual offences and robbery.  
Breaking down property crime into burglary and theft and handling of stolen goods 
reveals that no evidence of such “displacement” of crime appears. The reduction in theft and 
handling of stolen goods is best explained by the positive income shock implied by the RTB 
scheme. Moreover, and similarly, the breakdown of the results for violent crime by crime 
category shows results that are consistent with the notion that the income shock implied by the 
RTB scheme reduced the incentives to commit violence. In addition to a significant reduction 
in violence against the person, a significant negative effect of the RTB scheme is also found 
on robberies, which are categorised as violent crimes here because they involve a violent act, 
but they are also often economically motivated criminal offences. The RTB scheme was a big 
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income shock that induced a large number of incumbent tenants to purchase public housing 
and gentrify their properties, and thus it reduced the incentives (increased the opportunity cost) 
to engage in crime. 
iv. Long-Run Estimates 
a. Empirical strategy 
But what of the long-run consequences of homeownership on crime? This section 
presents estimates of the long-run effects of homeownership induced by the Right-to-Buy 
(RTB) policy on local crime rates. To do so, an instrumental variable (IV) long-differenced 
model specification is used, which again exploits variation in the size of the public housing 
stock in 1980 across localities. As argued above, exposure to the policy was bounded by the 
size of the public housing stock in 1980. Localities with few public houses could not experience 
large increases in the homeownership rate due to the more limited supply. As discussed in 
Section 2, variation in the size of the public housing stock across localities arose due to 
historical events around the period of the two World Wars, events which are unrelated to recent 
dynamics of crime. In formal terms, the set of estimating equations can be expressed as follows: 
, − , = + ∗ , + ∗ , + ∗ +     (3) 
, = + ∗ , + ,                                               (4) 
where , − ,  is the change in the crime rate in locality i from 2003 to 2017 and 
,  is the endogenous change in the size of the public housing stock from 1980 to 1992 
expressed as a proportion of the residential stock in 1980. ,  is therefore instrumented with 
, , the 1980 level of the public housing stock; ,  is the crime rate in locality i in 1980,  
is a vector of contemporaneous local area variables and  is the error term. As crime data is 
available from 2003 at the Local Authority (LA) level, this model can be estimated at the LA 
level.  
The identifying assumption in the model described in Equations 3 and 4 is that, 
conditional on the level of crime in 1980 and the set of contemporaneous local area variables 
captured in the vector , the size of the public housing stock in 1980 in the LA is exogenous 
to the dynamics of crime within the LA in the 2000s. The exclusion restriction is that, 
conditional on the level of crime in 1980 and the set of contemporaneous local area variables 
in the vector , the size of the public housing stock in 1980 affects the dynamics of crime in 




Summary data for the dependent variable in Equation 3 and the set of local area 
variables in the vector  are shown in Table 9. The crime rate fell over the period in more than 
90% of LAs. The 25th percentile log real hourly wage fell too over the period, while the share 
of 15-24 year olds in the population remained unchanged and the log unemployment rate rose 
(at a national level, the unemployment rate rose from 5% in March 2003 to 7.6% by March 
2013, during the period following the financial crisis). 
The instrumental variable regression requires a strong first-stage relationship between 
the public housing stock in 1980 and subsequent RTB sales over the period 1980-92. Figure 
A6 in Appendix A illustrates that there is a strong correlation between the size of the public 
housing stock in the LA in 1980 and subsequent sales under the RTB policy. The scatterplot in 
the Figure shows a strong positive relationship. The coefficient (standard error) on the 
instrument in the first-stage regression is 0.242 (0.017) with a F-statistic from the regression 
of 195.55.  
Estimates of Equation 3 are shown in Table 10. Estimates are grouped by the three 
measures of crime examined above: the overall crime rate in columns (1)-(3), property crime 
rate in columns (4)-(6) and violent crime rate in columns (7)-(9). The leftmost specification for 
each outcome includes only the independent variable of interest, , , instrumented by , . 
For each outcome, the coefficient on ,  is negative and precisely defined. The middle 
column of each sub-panel adds local area variables to the model, with the rightmost column of 
each sub-panel also adding a control for the crime rate in 1980. The coefficient on ,  remains 
negative and precisely defined in each specification. 
The coefficient estimates imply that LAs experiencing larger increases in 
homeownership experience more rapid crime reductions.  The coefficient value of 0.244 in 
column (3) of Table 10 implies that a five percentage point higher increase in the 
homeownership rate due to RTB sales caused an approximately fifty percent faster decline in 
crime rate over the period 2003-2017, an effect approximately equal to a one standard deviation 
higher speed of reduction in crime. Among the covariates, in all of the regressions the controls 
for the level of crime in 1980 return negative and precisely defined coefficients. These imply 
a degree of convergence in LA level crime rates: LAs with higher crime rates in 1980 
experienced a faster decline in crime in the early 2000s, conditional on the other covariates in 
the regression.  
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c. Additional Long-Run Estimates 
Did the RTB scheme leave any detectable mark on house prices and political 
preferences of indigenous communities? In this final sub-section, the long-run effects of 
increases in the homeownership rate brought about by RTB sales on house prices and on voting 
behaviour are examined. The increase in the homeownership rate via RTB sales increased the 
potential housing supply to the private resale market. Hence, all else being equal, RTB sales 
would be expected to decrease house prices over time. On the other hand, the RTB scheme 
may have also potentially increased the demand for housing in the private resale market. 
Moreover, in the presence of outward migration of low-income households and inward 
migration of higher-income households, RTB sales may have had a positive impact on house 
prices over time.  
To explore the impact of RTB sales on house prices, in column (1) of Table 11 the 
dependent variable was replaced with the change in the log of the average house price in the 
LA over the period 2003 to 2014. House price data is obtained from the Land Registry house 
price index. The set of control variables is the same as in the models shown in Column (2) of 
Table 10. The coefficient on RTB sales is negative and precisely defined, and it implies that a 
five percentage point increase in the homeownership rate due to RTB sales decreased house 
prices over the period by approximately 6.5%. This is an economically modest effect in the 
context of an approximate doubling of house prices on average in LAs over the sample period. 
However, this result highlights the general equilibrium effects of RTB sales on the housing 
market. 
Second, the effects of RTB sales on voting behaviour in LA elections were also 
estimated. To do so, LA-level data on vote shares in the local election were matched to the 
housing and crime data used so far and the changes in the Conservative vote share within the 
LA over the period 1995 – 2015 were constructed and modelled as the dependent variable in 
the regression. The sample size in these estimates is smaller, owing to the fact that the timing 
of LA election cycles varies across LAs. In Table 11, the coefficient on the RTB sales variable 
is positive and precisely defined. Hence, these estimates suggest that the RTB policy was 
effective in increasing the Conservative vote share in localities that saw larger increases in the 
homeownership rate under the policy. This result echoes the conclusion in Di Tella, Galiani 
and Schargrodsky (2007) that show that lucky squatters who received legal titles in Buenos 




This paper estimates the extent of local crime reduction connected to the increase in 
homeownership rates induced by the UK Government’s Right To Buy (RTB) scheme since 
1980. One of the key goals of the RTB scheme was, as it were, to ‘gentrify’ families 
endogenously. Specifically, it aimed to ease access to an owned property for (broadly) working 
class families and, in doing so, to alter their behaviour and induce them to take greater care of 
their property, as well as to alter their economic position by giving them a collateral asset in 
financial markets. The RTB scheme offered a means of upgrading the economic position of 
households in neighbourhoods previously dominated by public housing.  
The RTB scheme led to a reduction in crime. Estimates from the Thatcher era uncover 
an elasticity of crime with respect to sales of public housing of approximately -0.15, implying 
that a 10 percent increase in public housing sales reduced crime by around 1.5 percent. The 
RTB scheme led to a reduction in both property crime and violent crime, and both short run 
and longer run evidence of crime reduction is presented. However, rather than being driven by 
changes in the composition of households through inward and outward migration, the key 
mechanisms underlying the reduction in crime rates appear to be the behavioural changes that 
the RTB scheme induced within the local community. The findings suggest that new renters-
come-homeowners as a result of RTB altered their behaviour in response to the incentives 
arising from acquisition of housing wealth, leading to a form of “endogenous” gentrification. 
They made their properties safer and gained greater access to the insurance markets. 
While no evidence is found of compositional changes in the local population of 
different regions of the country, signs of this “endogenous” gentrification appear since the first 
year of the policy, when no resales of properties bought under the RTB scheme could have 
taken place while continuing to benefit from the discounts offered under this scheme. In line 
with this conclusion, and contrary to what a “migration-based” model of gentrification would 
predict, house prices decreased in the long run and Conservative votes increased in areas most 
affected by the RTB scheme. These results therefore vindicate the Thatcher rationale for the 
policy. More broadly, they suggest that increasing homeownership reduces local crime as 
public housing tenants become owners of their own homes separately from the process of 
gentrification whereby low-income neighbourhoods become middle-income neighbourhoods 
through outward migration of low-income households and inward migration of higher-income 
households. These results complement the existing literature and inform policy by showing 
how granting homeownership to indigenous communities can also act to reduce crime. 
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Before concluding, some words of caution are necessary. First, although the results are 
in line with the Thatcher rationale for the policy, they certainly do not vindicate it, since for 
that a more general welfare analysis is needed. Indeed, an analysis of this sort presented in 
Disney and Guo (2017) suggests that the RTB policy generated complex inter- and intra-
generational welfare effects. Second, given the crime reduction effects are identified off area 
variations in the take-up of RTB, one cannot attribute the overall fall in crime rates in Britain 
over the subsequent two decades post-1990 to the RTB policy. Nonetheless, the change in 
behaviour and beliefs in indigenous communities documented here shows a novel means, not 
documented to date, that complements the existing literature based on different research 
designs and settings, by which gentrification has contributed to declines in crime. Thus, 
housing provision and gentrification have scope to act as potentially important features of the 
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Figure 1. Housing Tenure Shares by Tenure Type: England and Wales 1918-2011














































































Figure 2. Right to-Buy and Other Sales of Public Housing in England, 1980-81 to 2013-14
Council house sales (mostly RTB) Sales of other social housing
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Notes: Figure shows for each Police Force Area (PFA) the crime rate in 1980 plotted against the fraction of 
public housing as a percent of the total residential stock in 1980. Crime is defined as total yearly counts of 
property and violent crime offences per population at the PFA level. Property crime defined as total yearly 
counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. Violent crime 
defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual offences per population at the PFA level. A linear 
function fitting the correlation between the PFA-specific fraction of public housing and the crime rate weighted 




















Notes: Figure shows for each Police Force Area (PFA) the sales of public housing under the 
Right-To-Buy (RTB) scheme by 1992 plotted against PFA-specific sales of public housing under 
the RTB scheme in 1980. A linear function fitting the distribution of PFA-specific sales weighted 
by PFA-specific population size in 1980 is also shown. For each PFA in the analysis, the 
horizontal axis shows the sales of public housing under the RTB scheme in 1980 as a percent of 
the total public housing stock in 1980, whereas the vertical axis shows the sales of public housing 
under the RTB scheme by 1992 as a percent of the total public housing stock in 1980. 
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Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right To Buy (RTB) 
Policy in England and Wales. Crime defined as total yearly counts of property and violent crime 
offences per population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Property crime defined as total yearly 
counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. 
Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual offences per population 
at the PFA level. Regressions weighted by population at the PFA level. Reported dots are point 
estimates and capped bars are 95% confidence intervals from Wild Cluster Bootstrap estimation 




















Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right To Buy (RTB) 
Policy in England and Wales. Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft 
or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. 
Regressions weighted by population at the PFA level. Reported dots are point estimates and capped 
bars are 95% confidence intervals from Wild Cluster Bootstrap estimation with robust standard 




















Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right To Buy (RTB) 
Policy in England and Wales. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and 
sexual offences per population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Regressions weighted by 
population at the PFA level. Reported dots are point estimates and capped bars are 95% confidence 





Figure 8. County-Specific Estimates of Correlation between Right-To-Buy (RTB) Public Housing Sales and Crime Victimisation against County-Specific 















Notes: The figure shows county-specific estimates of the correlation between Right-To-Buy 
Scheme (RTB) public housing sales and crime victimisation plotted against county-specific 
estimates of the correlation between RTB public housing sales and home improvement. A linear 
function fitting the distribution of county-specific estimates is also shown. For each county in the 
analysis, the horizontal axis shows the estimate of the correlation between RTB public housing 
sales and home improvement, whereas the vertical axis shows county-specific estimates of the 
correlation between RTB public housing sales and crime victimisation. Treatment group defined 
as homeowners who rented from the council the property in which they currently reside prior to 
buying it. Control group defined as council tenants who currently intend to buy the public property 




Table 1. Summary Data for 1980, Police Force Authorities (PFA) 
 
     Percentiles 
 mean sd Min max p25 p50 p75 p90 
Housing Stock         
Public Housing Stock (% Residential Stock) 27.202 8.574 14.568 43.798 21.865 22.966 34.096 41.869 
Public Housing Sales (% Public Housing Stock) 1.519 0.804 0.056 3.512 1.217 1.380 1.964 2.673 
Public Housing Units 191721 177523 27612 563046 71116 98794 246040 563046 
Residential Stock Units 725288 738428 128410 2462295 301632 427384 639665 2462295 
Crime Variables         
All Crime Rate 0.045 0.016 0.020 0.069 0.031 0.038 0.060 0.069 
Property Crime Rate 0.042 0.015 0.019 0.065 0.030 0.035 0.057 0.065 
Violent Crime Rate 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Covariates         
Log Unemployment Rate     -2.885 0.357     -3.730     -2.120     -3.219     -2.882     -2.688   -2.435 
Log 25th Percentile Real Hourly Earnings 1.345 0.070 1.228 1.497 1.305 1.327 1.360 1.497 
Fraction 15-24 Year Olds in Population 0.157 0.008 0.138 0.173 0.152 0.158 0.162 0.165 

















Notes: Crime variables are measured as crime rates at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Crime defined as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per population 
at the PFA level. Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. Violent crime defined as 
total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual offences per population at the PFA level. Local area variables are the log of the unemployment rate, the 25th percentile log real 
hourly wage and the share of 15-24 year olds in the population, each measured at the PFA geography. 
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Table 2. Crime Rate and Public Housing Stock in 1980 OLS Estimates, Police Force Area (PFA) 
 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






























       
























Notes: Table reports estimates from Ordinary Least Squares regression models. Dependent variables are crime rates. Crime defined 
as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Property crime 
defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. Violent 
crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual offences per population at the PFA level. Data units are 42 PFAs 
in 1980. Standard errors shown in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates 
significance at 10%. 
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Table 3.  Difference-in-Differences Before and After the Right-To-Buy Scheme 
 
  
Treatment PFAs (Public 
Housing Sales in 1980 >= p50) 
 
 
Control PFAs (Public Housing 










DiD % Effect 
((4) / Pre (2)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
A. All Crime       
      
Pre-  0.033                 0.049    -0.016   
Post-  0.049                 0.073    -0.024   
Post – Pre  0.016                 0.024  -0.008*** 
(p = 0.004) 
-16.3% 
      
B. Property Crime       
      
Pre-  0.031                 0.046     -0.015   
Post-  0.046                 0.068     -0.022   
Post – Pre  0.015                 0.022  -0.007*** 
(p = 0.006) 
-15.2% 
      
C. Violent Crime       
      
Pre-  0.002                 0.003     -0.001   
Post-  0.003                 0.005     -0.002   
Post – Pre  0.001                 0.002  -0.001*** 
(p = 0.007) 
-33.3% 
Number of Police 
Force Areas 
21 21              









Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right to Buy (RTB) Policy in England and Wales. Crime defined as total 
yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Property crime defined as total yearly counts 
of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, 
violent and sexual offences per population at the PFA level. Averages weighted by population at the PFA level. Standard errors were clustered at the 
PFA level and p-values from Wild Cluster Bootstrap are reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient divided by mean of 
dependent variable in the control group (Public Housing Sales in 1980 < p50) prior to 1980 reported here. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates 
significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 4. Estimates of Impact of Right-To-Buy Public Housing Sales on Crime, 1975 – 1992 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
A. Total Crime       
       
(Sales >= p50) x Post -0.009*** 
(p = 0.005) 
  -0.008*** 
(p = 0.009) 
  
(Sales >= p50) x 1980-84  -0.005** 
(p = 0.029) 
  -0.005** 
(p = 0.027) 
 
(Sales >= p50) x 1985-92   -0.011*** 
(p = 0.003) 
  -0.010** 
(p = 0.010) 
% Effect -18.4% -10.2% -22.4% -16.3% -10.2% -20.4% 
       
B. Property Crime       
       
(Sales >= p50) x Post -0.008*** 
(p = 0.007) 
  -0.007** 
(p = 0.011) 
  
(Sales >= p50) x 1980-84  -0.005** 
(p = 0.029) 
  -0.005** 
(p = 0.032) 
 
(Sales >= p50) x 1985-92   -0.009** 
(p = 0.011) 
  -0.008** 
(p = 0.016) 
% Effect -17.4% -10.9% -19.6% -15.2% -10.9% -17.4% 
       
C. Violent Crime       
       
(Sales >= p50) x Post -0.001*** 
(p = 0.007) 
  -0.001*** 
(p = 0.000) 
  
(Sales >= p50) x 1980-84  -0.0004* 
(p = 0.091) 
  -0.0004** 
(p = 0.025) 
 
(Sales >= p50) x 1985-92   -0.001*** 
(p = 0.005) 
  -0.001*** 
(p = 0.000) 
% Effect -33.3% -13.3% -33.3% -33.3% -13.3% -33.3% 
       
Log Unemployment Rate No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Log 25th Percentile Earnings No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fraction 15-24 Years Old No No No Yes Yes Yes 
PFA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample Size 756 756 756 756 756 756 




















Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right to Buy (RTB) Policy in England and Wales. 
Sales of public housing calculated in 1980. Crime defined as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per 
population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of 
stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual 
offences per population at the PFA level. Regressions weighted by population at the PFA level. Standard errors were clustered at 
the PFA level and p-values from Wild Cluster Bootstrap are reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient 
divided by mean of dependent variable in the control group (Public Housing Sales in 1980 < p50) prior to 1980 reported in Table 
3. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 5. Estimates of Impact of Right-To-Buy Public Housing Sales on Crime, 1975 – 1992 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
A. Total Crime       
       
Sales x Post -0.005*** 
  (p = 0.002) 
  -0.005*** 
 (p = 0.002) 
  
Sales x 1980-84  -0.004*** 
  (p = 0.005) 
  -0.004*** 
 (p = 0.007) 
 
Sales x 1985-92   -0.006*** 
  (p = 0.004) 
  -0.006*** 
 (p = 0.008) 
% Effect -10.2% -8.2% -12.2% -10.2% -8.2% -12.2% 
       
B. Property Crime       
       
Sales x Post -0.005*** 
  (p = 0.004) 
  -0.004*** 
  (p = 0.007) 
  
Sales x 1980-84  -0.004*** 
  (p = 0.005) 
  -0.003*** 
 (p = 0.007) 
 
Sales x 1985-92   -0.006*** 
  (p = 0.007) 
  -0.005** 
   (p = 0.026) 
% Effect -10.9% -8.7% -13.0% -8.7% -6.5% -10.9% 
       
C. Violent Crime       
       
Sales x Post -0.0004** 
  (p = 0.025) 
        -0.0004** 
(p = 0.012) 
  
Sales x 1980-84  -0.0002** 
  (p = 0.046) 
  -0.0002** 
(p = 0.027) 
 
Sales x 1985-92   -0.0005** 
  (p = 0.024) 
  -0.0006*** 
(p = 0.009) 
% Effect -13.3% -6.7% -16.7% -13.3% -6.7% -20% 
       
Log Unemployment Rate No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Log 25th Percentile Earnings No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fraction 15-24 Years Old No No No Yes Yes Yes 
PFA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample Size 756 756 756 756 756 756 


















Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right to Buy (RTB) Policy in England and Wales. 
Sales of public housing calculated in 1980. Crime defined as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per 
population at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of 
stolen goods offences per population at the PFA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual 
offences per population at the PFA level. Regressions weighted by population at the PFA level. Standard errors were clustered at 
the PFA level and p-values from Wild Cluster Bootstrap are reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient 
divided by mean of dependent variable in the control group (Public Housing Sales in 1980 < p50) prior to 1980 reported in Table 
3. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 6. Estimates of Impact of Right-To-Buy (RTB) Public Housing Sales on Local Area Outcomes and (Log) Value of RTB Public Housing Sales on 









Years Old in 
Population 
Total Crime (Log) Count 
of Police 
Officers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
(Sales >= p50) x Post -0.112 
(p = 0.157) 
0.007 
(p = 0.930) 
-0.0006 
(p = 0.747) 
 -0.033 
(p = 0.555) 
Sales Log Value x Post    -0.002 
(p = 0.306) 
 
    
% Effect   -0.004% -4.1%  
      
Log Unemployment Rate No No No No No 
Log 25th Percentile Earnings No No No No No 
Fraction 15-24 Years Old No No No No No 
PFA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sample Size 756 756 756 756 756 



















Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right to Buy (RTB) Policy in England and Wales. Local area 
outcomes measured at the PFA level. Crime defined as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per population at the Police 
Force Area (PFA) level. Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population 
at the PFA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, violent and sexual offences per population at the PFA level. 
Regressions weighted by population at the PFA level. Standard errors were clustered at the PFA level and p-values from Wild Cluster Bootstrap 
are reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient divided by mean of dependent variable in the control group (Public 
Housing Sales in 1980 < p50) prior to 1980. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7. Correlation between Right-To-Buy Public Housing Sales and Home Improvement, Insurance and Social Behaviour, 1988. 
 
  Installed Double 
Locks on Outside 
Doors 
Installed Locks on 
Windows 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Panel A. RTB Scheme 0.217*** 
(p = 0.000) 
0.193*** 
(p = 0.000) 
0.251*** 
(p = 0.000) 
0.043** 
(p = 0.037) 
0.005 
(p = 0.828) 
       
 % Effect 60.6% 130.4% 38.4% 226.3% 8.1% 
       
       
Panel B. RTB Scheme 0.230*** 
(p = 0.000) 
0.166*** 
(p = 0.004) 
0.228*** 
(p = 0.000) 
0.043* 
(p = 0.085) 
0.020 
(p = 0.450) 
       
 % Effect 64.2% 112.2% 34.9% 226.3% 32.3% 
       
 Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Age (quadratic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Burglary Victimization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Household Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Household Rooms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Household Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Employment Status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 Mean Dep. Var. Control Group 0.358 0.148 0.654 0.019 0.062 
       
 Sample Size 520 520 520 520 520 









Notes: Treatment group defined as homeowners who rented from the council the property in which they currently reside prior to buying it. Control group defined as 
council tenants who currently intend to buy the public property in which they reside within two years. Standard errors were clustered at the county level and p-values from 
Wild Cluster Bootstrap are reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient divided by mean of dependent variable in the control group (council 
tenants who intend to buy the public property in which they reside within two years) reported here. Panel A reports unconditional OLS estimates and Panel B reports 
conditional OLS estimates where controls for gender, ethnicity, age, burglary victimization, household type, household rooms, household income, employment status and 
county fixed effects were included in the estimating equation. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8. Estimates of Impact of Right-To-Buy Public Housing Sales on Crime Separately by Crime Category, 1975 – 1992 
 
 Property Crime Violent Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Burglary Violence Against the Person 
     
(Sales >= p50) x Post -0.003** 
(p = 0.048) 
        -0.0005*** 
(p = 0.000) 
 
Sales x Post  -0.002*** 
(p = 0.005) 
 -0.0003*** 
(p = 0.005) 
     
% Effect -22% -17.3% -26.1% -13.5% 
     
 Theft and Handling of Stolen Goods Sexual Offences 
     
(Sales >= p50) x Post -0.004*** 
(p = 0.003) 
 -0.00002 
(p = 0.463) 
 
Sales x Post  -0.002* 
(p = 0.061) 
 0.00001 
(p = 0.431) 
     
% Effect -11.9% -6.2% -4.8% 2.5% 
     
   Robbery 
     
(Sales >= p50) x Post   -0.0003** 
(p = 0.063) 
 
Sales x Post        -0.0002** 
(p = 0.040) 
     
% Effect   -94.3% -47.9% 
     
Log Unemployment Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log 25th Percentile Earnings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fraction 15-24 Years Old Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 756 756 756 756 





Notes: Post-period defined as starting from 1980, the date of adoption of the Right to Buy (RTB) Policy in England and Wales. 
Yearly counts of crime were measured at the Police Force Area (PFA) level for all crime categories. Regressions weighted by 
population at the PFA level. Standard errors were clustered at the PFA level and p-values from Wild Cluster Bootstrap are 
reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient divided by mean of dependent variable in the control group 
(Public Housing Sales in 1980 < p50) prior to 1980. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates 
significance at 10%. 
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Table 9. Summary Data for Long-Difference Analysis 
 
     Percentiles 
 mean sd min max p25 p50 p75 p90 
Housing Variables         
1.Public House Sales 1980-1992 3718 3429 151 33386 1843 2643 4223 7857 
2.Public House Stock 1980 15032 16757 2180 148394 6358 8912 18018 32832 
1./2. 29 13 0 116 22 27 35 42 
Crime Variables         
All Crime Rate -0.020 0.011 -0.075 0.002 -0.026 -0.019 -0.013 -0.008 
Property Crime Rate -0.015 0.009 -0.064 0.001 -0.019 -0.013 -0.009 -0.006 
Violent Crime Rate -0.005 0.004 -0.018 0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 
Covariates         
Log Unemployment Rate 0.466 0.462 -0.816 1.901 0.183 0.476 0.768 1.004 
Log 25th Percentile Real Hourly Earnings -0.084 0.058 -0.278 0.139 -0.117 -0.080 -0.047 -0.018 
Fraction of 15-24 Year Olds in Population -0.000 0.009 -0.035 0.034 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.009 






















Notes: Crime variables are measured as crime rates at the Local Authority (LA) level. Crime defined as total yearly counts of 
property and violent crime offences per population at the LA level. Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and 
theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the LA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, 
violent and sexual offences per population at the LA level. Local area variables are the log of the unemployment rate, the 25th 
percentile log real hourly wage and the share of 15-24 year olds in the population, each measured at the LA geography. 
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Table 10. IV Estimates of Impact of Change in Public Housing Stock 1980-1992 on Change in Crime Rate 2003-2017 
 




Δ Violent  
Crime Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          




















          
Changes in Covariates           
          




































Crime Rate in 1980          
          
All Crime Rate in 1980   -0.318*** 
(0.052) 
      
Property Crime Rate in 1980      -0.201*** 
(0.043) 
   
Violent Crime Rate in 1980         -1.719*** 
(0.287) 
          








Notes: Table reports Instrumental Variable estimates. Crime defined as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per population at the LA level. Property 
crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods offences per population at the LA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of 
robbery, violent and sexual offences per population at the LA level. Dependent variable is the change in the Local Authority (LA) crime rate between 2003 and 2017 for each 
crime type denoted by column headings. Independent variables are i) total Right-to-Buy sales within the LA for the period 1980 to 1992 (divided by 1980 residential stock), 
ii) changes in the log unemployment rate, in the 25th percentile log real hourly wage and in the share of 15-24 year olds in the population, each measured at the LA level, iii) 
crime rates in 1980 for each crime type denoted by column headings, measured at the Police Force Area (PFA) level. The instrument for i) is the stock of public housing in 




Table 11. IV Estimates of Impact of Change in Public Housing Stock 1980-1992 on Changes in (Log) Average House Price and Conservative Vote Share 
 




Δ Con  
Vote Share 
 in LA 
 
 (1) (2) 
   




   
Changes in Covariates    
   












   


















Notes: Table reports Instrumental Variable estimates. In Column (1) the dependent 
variable is the change in the log of the average house price in the Local Authority 
(LA) between 2003 and 2017. In Column (2) the dependent variable is the change 
in the Conservative vote share in Local Authority elections between 1995/6 and 
2014/15. Independent variables are i) total Right-to-Buy sales within the LA for 
the period 1980 to 1992 (divided by 1980 residential stock), ii) changes in the log 
unemployment rate, in the 25th percentile log real hourly wage and in the share of 
15-24 year olds in the population, each measured at the LA level. The instrument 
for i) is the stock of public housing in the local authority in 1980 (divided by 1980 
residential stock). *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. 
* indicates significance at 10%. 
 
APPENDIX – ONLINE ONLY 
 
 
A. Data Sources 
 
a. Public Housing Stock and Residential Stock in 1980 
 
Public housing stock records for 1980 are sourced from the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Rate Collection Statistics 1980-81 Actuals, SIS ref: 42.82. 
This publication is based on data returned by authorities from DoE forms VO7140. The data 
covers 33 London Boroughs, 34 Metropolitan District Councils, 286 English Non-
Metropolitan District Councils and 37 Welsh District Councils, which we refer to in the main 
paper as Local Authorities. The data cover 97.3% of total rateable hereditaments. The number 
of residential properties in the Local Authority is stated at Column 2 ‘Domestic’, with the 
number of public house properties in the Local Authority stated at Column 22 ‘Council 
Dwellings’. These data were extracted from hard copy held by UK libraries.  
 
b. Right-to-Buy Public Housing Sales  
 
Data on the number of public housing properties sold each year through the Right-to-Buy 
scheme by each Local Authority for the period 1980 - 2001 are sourced from the CIPFA 
Housing Revenue Account (HRA). The HRA records expenditure and income on running a 
council’s own housing stock and closely related services or facilities, which are provided 
primarily for the benefit of the council’s own tenants. Under the Housing Act 1985 Local 
Authorities are obliged to report revenues from public house sales via their HRA. These data 
are accessed under license from CIPFA. For further details see https://www.cipfa.org/policy-
and-guidance/publications (link last accessed on 28 March 2020). We use these data in our 
main analysis. For Figures 1 and 2 we also source data on sales under the Right-to-Buy scheme 
after 2001. These data are provided by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government Table 685. For further details see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-social-housing-sales 
(link last accessed on 28 March 2020). 
 
c. Crime  
 
Area-level crime data compiled by the Home Office and published annually in Criminal 
Statistics for the period between 1975 and 1992 were sourced from the archives of the LSE 
Library, where both hard and soft copies of the data can be accessed. Yearly crime records of 
all Local Police Forces in England and Wales were available at the Police Force Area (PFA) 
level and, with the sole exception of the City of London, they were used in this analysis. Area-
level crime data compiled by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and published annually 
on the ONS website for the period between 2003 and 2017 were available at the Local 
Authority (LA) level. Due to the redrawing of LA boundaries over time, it was not possible 
to include all LAs in the analysis. Our analysis for the period between 2003 and 2017 therefore 
includes 293 LAs. These data can be freely accessed here: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/recordedc
rimedataatcommunitysafetypartnershiplocalauthoritylevel/current (link last accessed on 28 
March 2020). 
 
d. Local Area Circumstances 
 
Local area circumstances were measured using the New Earnings Survey (NES) provided by 
the Department for Employment for the period 1975-1992, and using the version of the 
Annual Population Survey (APS) that is publicly available on the Nomis website for the 
period 2003-2017. Access to data on local unemployment rates during the period 1975-1992 
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was obtained from the Department of Employment. Permission to access the NES data must 
be obtained via the UK Data Service and are downloadable at the following link: 
https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/studies/#!?Search=new%20earnings%20surve
y&Rows=10&Sort=1&DateFrom=440&DateTo=2020&Page=1 (link last accessed on 28 
March 2020). The Nomis website can be freely accessed here: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ 
(link last accessed on 28 March 2020). Local area population data compiled by the Home 
Office and published annually in Criminal Statistics for the period between 1975 and 1992 
were sourced from the archives of the LSE Library, where both hard and soft copies of the 
data can be accessed. Area-level population data compiled by the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) and published annually on the ONS website for the period between 2003 and 2017 
were available at the Local Authority (LA) level. These data can be freely accessed here: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populatio
nestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland 
(link last accessed on 28 March 2020). 
 
e. Home Improvement, Insurance and Social Behaviour (Table 7). 
 
Individual level data on homeownership, expenditure, individual and property characteristics, 
income, employment status and locality of residence used in Table 7 were obtained from the 
British Crime Survey (BCS) 1988. Access to the BCS 1988 data must be obtained via the UK 
Data Service and are downloadable at the following link:  
https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/studies/study?id=2706&type=Data%20catalo
gue (link last accessed on 28 March 2020). 
 
f. Election Results  
 
Data on the Conservative vote share in Local Elections for the period 1995/6 to 2014/15 are 
sourced from the British Local Elections Database maintained by the University of Plymouth, 
UK. The Conservative vote share is calculated as the proportion of all votes cast in the election 
for Conservative candidates. Ware, L., Rallings, C., Thrasher, M. (2006). British Local 
Election Database, 1889-2003. [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 5319, 
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5319-1 (link last accessed on 28 March 2020). 
 
g. House Prices 
 
House price data is obtained from the UK Land Registry House Price Index (HPI), the UK’s 
official house price index. The HPI uses house sales data from HM Land Registry, Registers 
of Scotland, and Land and Property Services Northern Ireland and is calculated and 
maintained by the Office for National Statistics. Local Authority house price index values 
were extracted from the HPI Full File. For further details see 
https://landregistry.data.gov.uk/app/doc/ukhpi (link last accessed on 28 March 2020). 
 






Notes: The figure shows for each Borough in London the public houses built from 1945-64 as a 
fraction of the residential stock plotted against the average number of bombs per dwelling. A 
linear function fitting the correlation between the Borough-specific average number of bombs per 
dwelling and the public housing built from 1945-64 as a fraction of the residential stock is also 
shown in the figure. 
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Figure A2. Residential Housing Stock in 1980, by Local Authority (LA) 
 
a) Public Housing Stock (% Residential Stock) 
 





Notes: Data from 344 Local Authority (LA) Districts in 1980. Panel a shows public housing stock in 1980 within the LA (shown in 
Panel b) divided by the total residential housing stock in 1980 within the LA (shown in Panel c). 
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Figure A3. Right-to-Buy Public Housing Sales 1980-1992, by Local Authority (LA) 
 
a) Right-to-Buy Public Housing Sales (% 1980 Residential Stock) 
 






Notes: Data from 344 Local Authority (LA) Districts. Panel A shows total RTB public housing sales in the period 1980-1992 as a percentage 
of the 1980 residential stock in the LA. Panel B shows a count of total RTB public housing sales over the period 1980-1992 in the LA. 
Panel C shows total RTB public housing sales in the period 1980-1992 as a percentage of the 1980 public housing stock in the LA. 
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Figure A4. Correlation between Crime and Right-To-Buy Public Housing Sales in 1980. 
 














Notes: Figure shows for each Police Force Area (PFA) the crime rate in 1980 plotted against the 
fraction of public housing sold under the Right-To-Buy (RTB) scheme in 1980. Crime is defined 
as total yearly counts of property and violent crime offences per population at the PFA level. 
Property crime defined as total yearly counts of burglary and theft or handling of stolen goods 
offences per population at the PFA level. Violent crime defined as total yearly counts of robbery, 
violent and sexual offences per population at the PFA level. A linear function fitting the 
correlation between the PFA-specific fraction of public housing sold under the RTB scheme in 




















Notes: Figure shows for each Police Force Area (PFA) the sales of public housing under the 
Right-To-Buy (RTB) scheme by 1992 plotted against the share of conservative votes in the local 
elections of 1977. A linear function fitting the distribution of PFA-specific sales and conservative 
votes weighted by PFA-specific population size in 1980 is also shown. For each PFA in the 
analysis, the horizontal axis shows the share of conservative votes in the local elections of 1977, 
whereas the vertical axis shows the sales of public housing under the RTB scheme by 1992 as a 
percent of the total public housing stock in 1980. 
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Notes: Figure shows scatter plot of public housing in 1980 (as a proportion of the Local Authority 
resident stock) on the x-axis and subsequent Right-to-Buy public housing sales between 1980 and 
1992 (as a proportion of the Local Authority residential stock) on the y-axis. Binned scatterplot 
of 344 observations. 
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Table A1. Correlation between Right-To-Buy Public Housing Sales and Crime Victimisation, 1988. 
 
 Crime Victimisation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  % Effect  % Effect  % Effect 
       
RTB Scheme -0.202*** 
(p = 0.002) 
-24.9% -0.171* 
(p = 0.059) 
-21.1% -0.193*** 
(p = 0.005) 
-23.8% 
RTB Share     -0.013 
(p = 0.430) 
-1.6% 
       
County Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  
       
Mean Dep. Var. Control Group 0.810  0.810  0.810  
       
Sample Size 1058  1058  1058  







Notes: Treatment group defined as homeowners who rented from the council the property in which they currently reside 
prior to buying it. Control group defined as council tenants who currently intend to buy the public property in which they 
reside within two years. For each respondent, RTB Share calculated as share of other treatment group respondents at the 
county level (leaving out the respondent herself/himself). Standard errors were clustered at the county level and p-values 
from Wild Cluster Bootstrap are reported in parentheses. % Effect calculated as estimated coefficient divided by mean of 
dependent variable in the control group (council tenants who intend to buy the public property in which they reside within 
two years) reported here. *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 
10%. 
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